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ABSTRACT 
Online antisemitism is hard to quantify. How can it be measured in rapidly growing and diversifying 
platforms? Are the numbers of antisemitic messages rising proportionally to other content or is it the 
case that the share of antisemitic content is increasing? How does such content travel and what are 
reactions to it? How widespread is online Jew-hatred beyond infamous websites and fora, and closed 
social media groups? 
However, at the root of many methodological questions is the challenge of finding a consistent way 
to identify diverse manifestations of antisemitism in large datasets. What is more, a clear definition is 
essential for building an annotated corpus that can be used as a gold standard for machine learning 
programs to detect antisemitic online content. We argue that antisemitic content has distinct features 
that are not captured adequately in generic approaches of annotation, such as hate speech, abusive 
language, or toxic language. 
We discuss our experiences with annotating samples from our dataset that draw on a ten percent 
random sample of public tweets from Twitter. We show that the widely used definition of 
antisemitism by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance can be applied successfully to 
online messages if inferences are spelled out in detail and if the focus is not on intent of the 
disseminator but on the message in its context. However, annotators have to be highly trained and 
knowledgeable about current events to understand each tweet’s underlying message within its 
context. The tentative results of the annotation of two of our small but randomly chosen samples 
suggest that more than ten percent of conversations on Twitter about Jews and Israel are antisemitic 
or probably antisemitic. They also show that at least in conversations about Jews, an equally high 
number of tweets denounce antisemitism, although these conversations do not necessarily coincide. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Online hate propaganda, including 
antisemitism, has been observed since the 
early days of popular internet usage.1 Hateful 
material is easily accessible to a large 
audience, often without any restrictions. Social 
media has led to a significant proliferation of 
hateful content worldwide, by making it easier 
for individuals to spread their often highly 
offensive views. Reports on online 
antisemitism often highlight the rise of 
antisemitism on social media platforms (World 
Jewish Congress 2016; Community Security 
Trust and Antisemitism Policy Trust. 2019). 
Several methodological questions arise when 
quantitatively assessing the rise in online 
antisemitism: How is the rise of antisemitism 
measured in rapidly growing and diversifying 
platforms? Are the numbers of antisemitic 
messages rising proportionally to other 
content or is it also the case that the share of 
antisemitic content is increasing? Are 
antisemitic messages mostly disseminated on 
infamous websites and fora such as The Daily 
Stormer, 4Chan/pol or 8Chan/pol, Gab, and 
closed social media groups, or is this a wider 
phenomenon?  
However, in addition to being offensive there 
have been worries that this content might 
radicalize other individuals and groups who 
might be ready to act on such hate 
propaganda. The deadliest antisemitic attack 
in U.S. history, the shooting at the Tree of Life 
Synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania on 
October 27, 2018, and the shooting in Poway, 
California on April 27, 2019, are such cases. 
Both murderers were active in neo-Nazi social 
media groups with strong evidence that they 
had been radicalized there. White supremacist 
online radicalization has been a factor in other 
shootings, too, where other minorities, such as 
 
1  The Simon Wiesenthal Center was one of the 
pioneers in observing antisemitic and neo-Nazis 
hate sites online, going back to 1995 when it found 
only one hate site (Cooper 2012). 
2 Yang et al. argue that the use of data from social 
media improves the crime hotspot prediction 
Muslims (Christchurch mosque shootings in 
March 2019) as well as people of Hispanic 
origin have been targeted (Texas shootings in 
August 2019). Extensive research and 
monitoring of social media posts might help to 
predict and prevent hate crimes in the future, 
much like what has been done for other 
crimes.2  
Until a few years ago, social media companies 
have relied almost exclusively on users flagging 
hateful content for them before evaluating the 
content manually. The livestreaming video of 
the shootings at the mosque in Christchurch, 
which was subsequently shared within 
minutes by thousands of users, showed that 
this policy of flagging is insufficient to prevent 
such material from being spread. The use of 
algorithms and machine learning to detect 
such content for immediate deletion has been 
discussed but it is technically challenging and 
presents moral challenges due to censorial 
repercussions. 
There has been rising interest in hate speech 
detection in academia, including antisemitism. 
This interest, including ours, is driven largely by 
the aim of monitoring and observing online 
antisemitism, rather than by efforts to censor 
and suppress such content. However, one of 
the major challenges is definitional clarity. 
Legal definitions are usually minimalistic and 
social media platforms’ guidelines tend to be 
vague. “Abusive content” or “hate speech” is 
ill-defined, lumping together different types of 
abuse (Vidgen et al. 2019). We argue that 
antisemitic content has distinct features that 
are not captured adequately in more generic 
approaches, such as hate speech, or abusive or 
toxic language. 
In this paper, we propose an annotation 
process that focuses on antisemitism 
exclusively and which uses a detailed and 
accuracy (D. Yang et al. 2018). Müller and Schwarz 
found a strong correlation between anti-refugee 
sentiment expressed on an AfD Facebook page and 
anti-refugee incidents in Germany (Müller and 
Schwarz 2017). 
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transparent definition of antisemitism. The 
lack of details of the annotation process and 
annotation guidelines that are provided in 
publications in the field have been identified as 
one of the major obstacles for the 
development of new and more efficient 
methods by the abusive content detection 
community (Vidgen et al. 2019, 85). 
Our definition of antisemitism includes 
common stereotypes about Jews, such as “the 
Jews are rich,” or “Jews run the media” that 
are not necessarily linked to offline action and 
that do not necessarily translate into online 
abuse behavior against individual Jews. We 
focus on (public) conversations on the popular 
social media platform Twitter where users of 
diverse political backgrounds are active. This 
enables us to draw from a wide spectrum of 
conversations on Jews and related issues. We 
hope that our discussion of the annotation 
process will help to build a comprehensive 
ground truth dataset that is relevant beyond 
conversations among extremists or calls for 
violence. Automated detection of antisemitic 
content, even under the threshold of “hate 
speech,” will be useful for a better 
understanding of how such content is 
disseminated, radicalized, and opposed.  
Additionally, our samples provide us with 
some indications of how users talk about Jews 
and related issues and how much of this is 
antisemitic. We used samples of tweets that 
are small but randomly chosen from all tweets 
in 2018 with certain keywords (“Jew*” and 
“Israel”). 
While reports on online antisemitism by NGOs, 
such as the Anti-Defamation League (Anti-
Defamation League 2019; Center for 
Technology and Society at the Anti-
Defamation League 2018), the Simon 
Wiesenthal Center (Simon Wiesenthal Center 
2019), the Community Security Trust 
(Community Security Trust 2018; Stephens-
Davidowitz 2019; Community Security Trust 
and Signify 2019), and the World Jewish 
Congress (World Jewish Congress 2018, 2016) 
provide valuable insights and resources, it has 
been noted that the fact that their data and 
methodology are concealed “places limits on 
the use of these findings for the scientific 
community” (Finkelstein et al. 2018, 2). 
Previous academic studies on online 
antisemitism have used keywords and a 
combination of keywords to find antisemitic 
posts, mostly within notorious websites or 
social media sites (Gitari et al. 2015). 
Finkelstein et al. tracked the antisemitic 
“Happy Merchant” meme, the slur “kike” and 
posts with the word “Jew” on 4chan’s 
Politically Incorrect board (/pol/) and Gab. 
They then calculated the percentage of posts 
with those keywords and put the number of 
messages with the slur “kike” in correlation to 
the word “Jew” in a timeline (Finkelstein et al. 
2018). The Community Security Trust in 
association with Signify identified the most 
influential accounts in engaging with online 
conversations about Jeremy Corbyn, the 
Labour Party and antisemitism. They then 
looked at the most influential accounts in more 
detail (Community Security Trust and Signify 
2019). Others, such as the comprehensive 
study on Reddit by the Center for Technology 
and Society at the Anti-Defamation League, 
rely on manual classification, but fail to share 
their classification scheme and do not use 
representative samples (Center for Technology 
and Society at the Anti-Defamation League 
2018). One of the most comprehensive 
academic studies on online antisemitism was 
published by Monika Schwarz-Friesel 
(Schwarz-Friesel 2019). She and her team 
selected a variety of datasets to analyze how 
antisemitic discourse evolved around certain 
(trigger) themes and events in the German 
context through a manual in-depth analysis. 
This approach has a clear advantage over the 
use of keywords to identify antisemitic 
messages because the majority of antisemitic 
messages are likely more subtle than using 
slurs and clearly antisemitic phrases. The 
downside is that given the overwhelmingly 
large datasets of most social media platforms 
a preselection has to be done to reduce the 
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number of posts that are then analyzed by 
hand. 
Automatic classification using Machine 
Learning and Artificial Intelligence methods for 
the detection of antisemitic content is 
definitely possible, but, to our knowledge, 
relevant datasets and corpora specific to 
antisemitism have not been made accessible 
to the academic community, as of yet.3 Various 
approaches focus on hate speech, racist or 
sexist content detection, abusive, offensive or 
toxic content, which include datasets and 
corpora in different languages, documented in 
the literature (e.g. (Anzovino, Fersini, and 
Rosso 2018; Davidson et al. 2017; Fortuna et 
al. 2019; Jigsaw 2017; Mubarak, Darwish, and 
Magdy 2017; Mulki et al. 2019; Nobata et al. 
2016; Sanguinetti et al. 2018; Waseem and 
Hovy 2016), but the domain of antisemitism in 
Twitter seems to be understudied. 
Keyword spotting of terms, such as the anti-
Jewish slur “kike” or of images, such as the 
“Happy Merchant,” might be sufficient on 
social media platforms that are used almost 
exclusively by White supremacists (Finkelstein 
et al. 2018). However, on other platforms they 
also capture messages that call out the usage 
of such words or images by other users. This is 
especially relevant in social media that is more 
mainstream, such as Twitter, as we show in 
detail below. Additionally, simple spotting of 
words such as “Kike” might lead to false results 
due to the possibility of varying meanings of 
these combinations of letters. Enrique García 
Martínez for example is a much-famed soccer 
player, known as Kike. News about him 
resulted in significant peaks of the number of 
 
3 A widely used annotated dataset on racism and 
sexism is the corpus of 16k tweets made available 
on GitHub by Waseem and Hovy (Waseem and 
Hovy 2016), see 
http://github.com/zeerakw/hatespeech. Golbeck 
et al. produced another large hand coded corpus (of 
online harassment data) (Golbeck et al. 2017). Both 
datasets include antisemitic tweets, but they are 
not explicitly labeled as such. Warner and 
Hirschberg annotated a large corpus of flagged 
content from Yahoo! and websites that were 
tweets that contained the word “Kike” in our 
dataset from Twitter. However, even more 
sophisticated word level detection models are 
vulnerable to intentional deceit, such as 
inserting typos or change of word boundaries, 
which some users do to avoid automated 
detection of controversial content (Gröndahl 
et al. 2018; Warner and Hirschberg 2012). 
Another way to identify antisemitic online 
messages is to use data from users and/or 
organizations that have flagged content as 
antisemitic (Warner and Hirschberg 2012). 
Previous studies have tried to evaluate how 
much of the content that was flagged by users 
as antisemitic has subsequently been removed 
by social media companies. 4 However, these 
methods then rely on classification by 
(presumably non-expert) users and it is 
difficult to establish how representative the 
flagged content is compared to the total 
content on any given platform. 
This paper aims to contribute to reflections on 
how to build a meaningful gold standard 
corpus for antisemitic messages and to explore 
a method that can give us some indication of 
how widespread the scope of antisemitism 
really is on social media platforms like Twitter. 
We propose to use a definition of antisemitism 
that has been utilized by an increasing number 
of governmental agencies in the United States 
and Europe. To do so, we spell out how a 
concise definition could be used to identify 
instances of a varied phenomenon while 
applying it to a corpus of messages on social 
media. This enables a verifiable classification 
of online messages in their context.  
 
pointed out to them by the American Jewish 
Congress as being offensive and they explicitly 
classified content as antisemitic (Warner and 
Hirschberg 2012). However, the corpus is not 
available to our knowledge. 
4 See “Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate 
speech online: One year after,” published by the 
European Commission in June 2017,  
http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/document.cfm?do
c_id=45032, last accessed September 12, 
2019). 
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2 DATASET 
Our raw dataset is drawn from a ten percent 
sample of public tweets from Twitter via their 
Streaming API, collected by Indiana 
University’s Network Science Institute’s 
Observatory on Social Media (OSoMe). Twitter 
asserts that these tweets are randomly 
sampled. We cannot verify that independently, 
but we do not have any reason to believe 
otherwise. Tweets are collected live, on an 
ongoing basis, and then recorded (without 
images). We thus assume that the sample is 
indeed a representative sample of overall 
tweets. However, that does not mean that 
Twitter users or topics discussed within the 
sample are representative because users who 
send out numerous tweets will most likely be 
overrepresented, as well as topics that are 
discussed in many tweets.5 For this paper, we 
use data from the year 2018.6  
The overall raw sample includes 
11,300,747,876 tweets in 2018. There were 
some gaps in the dataset from July 1 to 25, 
2018, the number of tweets were only one 
percent instead of the usual ten percent. 7 
OSoMe provides us with datasets of tweets 
with any given keyword in JSON format. For 
this paper, we used the queries “Israel” and 
“Jew*” for 2018. The query “Israel” includes all 
tweets that have the word Israel, followed or 
prefixed by space or signs, but not letters. The 
 
5  Indiana University Network Science Institute’s 
Observatory on Social Media (OSoMe) collects a 10 
percent sample of public tweets from Twitter via 
elevated access to their streaming API, since 
September, 2010. “An important caveat is that 
possible sampling biases are unknown, as the 
messages are sampled by Twitter. Assuming that 
tweets are randomly sampled, as asserted by 
Twitter, the collection does not automatically 
translate into a representative sample of the 
underlying population of Twitter users, or of the 
topics discussed. This is because the distribution of 
activity is highly skewed across users and topics 
and, as a result, active users and popular topics are 
better represented in the sample. Additional 
sampling biases may also evolve over time due to 
changes in the platform.” (OSoMe, not dated, 
query “Jew*” includes all tweets that have the 
word Jew, followed by any letter or sign. The 
data includes the tweets’ text, the sender’s 
name, the date and time of the tweet, the 
number of retweets, the tweet and user ID, 
and other metadata. We had 3,427,731 tweets 
with the word “Jew*” from 1,460,075 distinct 
users in 2018 and 2,980,327 tweets with the 
word “Israel” from 1,101,373 distinct users. 
This data was then fed into the Digital Method 
Initiative’s Twitter Capture and Analysis 
Toolset (DMI-TCAT) for further analysis. Its 
open source code makes it transparent and 
allowed us to make changes which we used to 
tweak its function of producing smaller 
randomized samples from the dataset. We 
used this function to produce randomized 
samples of 400 tweets for both queries and 
then annotated these samples manually.  
We divided the 2018 data into three portions 
because we did not want the month of July to 
be heavily underrepresented due to the gap in 
the raw data collection from July 1st to 25th. 
https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/faq/ last accessed July 
23, 2019). 
6 We have also been collecting data from Twitter’s 
Streaming API for a list of more than 50 keywords. 
Data analysts have speculated that it provides 
between 1 and 40 percent of all tweets with these 
keywords. However, a cross comparison of the two 
different dataset suggests that in some months, the 
Twitter API provides approximately 100 percent of 
the tweets with certain keywords. However, we 
have not used these datasets for this paper. 
7 The OSoMe project provides an interactive graph 
that shows the number of collected tweets per day, 
see 
https://osome.iuni.iu.edu/moe/tweetcount/stats/, 
last accessed September 12, 2019. 
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January 1st to June 30th, 2018 has a ten percent 
stream, July 1st to 25th, 2018, has a one percent 
stream, and July 26th to December 31, 2018, 
has ten percent as well. Thus, each sample has 
198 tweets for the first period, 26 tweets from 
the second period and 176 tweets for the third 
period.8 
The tweets’ IDs allowed us to look at the 
tweets that were still live at the time of 
annotation on Twitter, which happened to be 
the majority of tweets. We were thus able to 
analyze the tweets within their context, 
including all images that were used, and also 
looking at previous tweets or reactions to the 
tweet.9 
 
 
 
8 This method of sampling is the closest we could 
get to our goal to have a randomized sample with 
our keywords for the year 2018. A better method 
would have been to draw a randomized sample of 
10 percent of our raw data from period one and 
three, to put it together with all data from period 
two (making it a one percent sample of all tweets 
for 2018) and to draw a randomized sample from 
that dataset. We have since found a method to 
3 ANNOTATING TWEETS – 
DECIDING WHAT IS 
ANTISEMITIC AND WHAT IS 
NOT 
Definitions of antisemitism vary and depend 
on their purpose of application (Marcus 2015). 
In legal frameworks the question of intent and 
motivation is usually an important one. Is a 
certain crime (partly) motivated by 
antisemitism? However, the intention of 
individuals is often difficult to discern in online 
messages and perhaps an unsuitable basis for 
definitions of online abuse (Vidgen et al. 2019, 
82). 
For our purposes, we are less concerned about 
motivation as compared to impact and 
interpretation of messages. Is a tweet likely to 
be interpreted in antisemitic ways? Does it 
transport and endorse antisemitic stereotypes 
and tropes?  
overcome these challenges and we will use this 
method in future sampling. 
9  Vidgen et al. have pointed out that often long 
range dependencies exist and might be important 
factors in the detection of abusive content (Vidgen 
et al. 2019, 84). Yang et al. showed that augmenting 
text with image embedding information improves 
automatically identifying hate speech (F. Yang et al. 
2019). 
  
Graph 1: Number of Tweets Collected by OSoMe per Day. Source OSoMe 
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INTENT OR IMPACT? 
The motivation and intent of the sender is not 
relevant for us because we do not want to 
determine if the sender is antisemitic but 
rather if the message’s content is antisemitic. 
A message can be antisemitic without being 
intentional. This can be illustrated with a tweet 
by a Twitter bot that sends out random short 
excerpts from plays by William Shakespeare. 
We came across a tweet that reads “Hebrew, a 
Jew, and not worth the name of a Christian.” 
sent out by the user “IAM_SHAKESPEARE,” see 
image 1 below. A look at the account confirms 
that this bot randomly posts lines from works 
of Shakespeare every ten minutes. Antisemitic 
intent of the bot and its programmer can 
almost certainly be ruled out. However, some 
of the quotes might carry antisemitic tropes, 
possibly the one mentioned above because it 
suggests a hierarchy between Jews and 
Christians and inherit negative character traits 
among Jews. 
 
 
Image 1: “Shakespeare” 
  
 
We thus look at the message itself and what 
viewers are likely to take away from it. 
However, it is still necessary to look at the 
overall context to understand the meaning and 
likely interpretations of it. Some, for example, 
might respond to a tweet with exaggerated 
stereotypes of Jews as a form of irony to call 
out antisemitism. However, the use of humor, 
irony and sarcasm does not necessarily mean 
that certain stereotypes are not disseminated 
(Vidgen et al. 2019, 83). 
 
Lastly, when examining the impact of a tweet, 
we only assessed the potential for transmitting 
antisemitism. Some tweets in our dataset 
 
10 The IHRA Working Definition has been adopted 
by more than a dozen governments to date. For an 
updated list see 
https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/workin
g-definitions-and-charters. It has also been 
expressed negativity towards other groups 
while also expressing animus towards Jews. 
Our annotation approach for this study 
focused on the components that pertained to 
antisemitism only, even while the authors of 
this paper acknowledge that animus for other 
groups is often related to antisemitism. 
FINDING THE RIGHT DEFINITION 
We use the most widely used definition of 
contemporary antisemitism, the Working 
Definition of Antisemitism by the International 
Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA). 10 
This non-legally binding definition was created 
in close cooperation with major Jewish 
organizations to help law enforcement officers 
and intragovernmental agencies to understand 
and recognize contemporary forms of 
antisemitism. Its international approach, its 
focus on contemporary forms, and the many 
examples that are included in the definition 
make it particularly useful for annotating 
tweets. However, many parts of the definition 
need to be spelled out to be able to use it as a 
standardized guideline for annotating tweets. 
For example, the definition mentions “classic 
stereotypes” and “stereotypical allegations 
about Jews as such,” without spelling out what 
they are. Spelling out the key stereotypes is 
necessary due to the vast quantity of 
stereotypes that have arisen historically, many 
of which are now hard to recognize outside of 
their original context. We did a close reading of 
the definition allowing for inferences that can 
clarify certain grey zones in the annotation. We 
also consulted the major literature on “classic” 
antisemitic stereotypes and stereotypical 
allegations to list the stereotypes and 
accusations against Jews that are considered 
to be “classical” antisemitism. The full text of 
the definition and our inferences can be found 
in Annex I and Annex II. Both texts served as 
the basis for our annotation. 
endorsed as a non-legal educational tool by the 
United Nation’s Special Rapporteur on freedom of 
religion or belief, Ahmed Shaheed (Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human 
Rights 2019). 
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WHO ARE THE ANNOTATORS? 
Scholars have argued that the various forms of 
antisemitism and its language can transform 
rapidly and that antisemitism is often 
expressed in indirect forms (Schwarz-Friesel 
and Reinharz 2017). Members of targeted 
communities, that is Jews in the case of 
antisemitism, are often more sensitive in 
detecting the changing language of hatred 
against their community. While monitoring 
bigotry, the perspective of targeted 
communities should be incorporated. Other 
studies on hate speech, such as the Anti-
Defamation League’s study on hate speech on 
Reddit, used an “intentionally-diverse team to 
annotate comments as hate or not hate” 
(Center for Technology and Society at the Anti-
Defamation League 2018, 17). The annotators 
in our project were graduate students who had 
taken classes on antisemitism and 
undergraduate students of Gunther Jikeli’s 
course “Researching Antisemitism in Social 
Media” at Indiana University in Spring 2019. All 
annotators had participated in extensive 
discussions of antisemitism and were 
familiarized with the definition of antisemitism 
that we use, including our inferences. Although 
our team of annotators had Jewish and non-
Jewish members, we aimed for a strict 
application of our definition of antisemitism 
that incorporates perspectives from major 
Jewish organizations. Within a relatively small 
team, individual discrepancies were 
hypothesized to be dependent upon training 
and attentiveness in the application of the 
definition rather than on an annotator’s 
background. One of the four annotators of the 
two samples that are discussed in this paper is 
Jewish. They classified slightly less tweets as 
antisemitic than her non-Jewish counterpart, 
see annotation results in table 1 below.  
GREY ZONES IN THE ANNOTATION 
Although we concentrate on the message itself 
and not on the motivation of the sender, we 
still need to examine the context in which the 
tweet is read, that is, the preceding tweets if 
situated in a thread. Reactions to it can also 
 
11 Annotators were instructed  to spend not more 
than five minutes on links, significantly more than 
provide information on how a particular tweet 
has been interpreted. We are looking at all the 
information that the reader is likely to see, and 
which will be part of the message the reader 
gets from a given tweet. We also examine 
embedded images and links.11  
We consider that posting links to antisemitic 
content without comment a form of 
disseminating content and therefore, an 
antisemitic message. However, if the user 
distances themselves from such links, in direct 
or indirect ways, using sarcasm or irony which 
makes it clear that there is disagreement with 
the view or stereotype in question, then the 
message is not considered antisemitic. Part of 
the context that the reader sees is the name 
and profile image of the sender. Both are 
visible while looking at a tweet. A symbol, such 
as a Nazi flag or a dangerous weapon might 
sway the reader to interpret the message in 
certain ways or might be antisemitic in and of 
itself as is the case with a Nazi flag.  
When it comes to grey zones, we erred on the 
side of caution. We classified tweets as 
antisemitic if they add antisemitic content, or 
if they directly include an antisemitic message, 
such as retweeting antisemitic content, or 
quoting antisemitic content in an approving 
manner.  
Endorsement of antisemitic movements, 
organizations, or individuals are treated as 
symbols. If they stand for taking harmful action 
against Jews, such as the German Nazi party, 
the Hungarian Arrow Cross, Hamas, Hitler, 
well-known Holocaust deniers, Father 
Coughlin, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, David 
Duke, or The Daily Stormer, then direct 
endorsement of such individuals, 
organizations, or movements are considered 
equivalent to calls for harming Jews and 
therefore antisemitic. If they are known for 
their antisemitic action or words but also for 
other things, then it depends on the context 
and on the degree to which they are known to 
the average smartphone user spends on longer 
news items (PEW Research Center 2016). 
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be antisemitic. Are they endorsed in a way that 
the antisemitic position for which these 
organizations or individuals stand for is part of 
the message? The British Union of Fascists, 
Mussolini, Hezbollah, or French comedian 
Dieudonné are likely to be used in such a way, 
but not necessarily so.    
Despite our best efforts to spell out as clearly 
as possible what constitutes antisemitic 
messages, there will remain room for 
interpretation and grey zones. The 
clarifications in Annex II are the results of our 
discussions about tweets that we classified 
differently in a preliminary study. 
ANNOTATION SCHEME 
How did we annotate the samples? We ran a 
script to separate deleted tweets from tweets 
that are still live and focused on those. 
However, some tweets were deleted between 
the time that we ran the script and annotated 
our samples. The first annotation point is 
therefore an option to mark if tweets are 
deleted. The second point of annotation 
provides an option to indicate if the tweet is in 
a foreign language.  
Our main scheme, to decide if tweets are 
antisemitic or not, explicitly according to the 
IHRA Definition and its inferences, was coded 
on a five-point scale from -2 to 2 where: 
-2 = Tweet is antisemitic (confident) 
-1 = Tweet is antisemitic (not confident) 
0 = Tweet is not comprehensible 
1 = Tweet is not antisemitic (not confident) 
2 = Tweet is not antisemitic (confident). 
 
The next annotation point gives the annotators 
the option to disagree with the IHRA Definition 
with respect to the tweet at hand. This gives 
the annotators the opportunity to classify 
something as antisemitic which does not fall 
 
12 Sentiment have been identified as an important 
indicator for hate speech or “toxic content” 
(Brassard-Gourdeau and Khoury 2019). 
13 We wrote an annotation program that facilitates 
the annotation process by pulling up the tweets and 
under the IHRA Definition or vice versa and 
might help to reduce personal bias if the 
annotators disagree with the IHRA Definition. 
We also asked annotators to classify tweets 
with respect to the sentiments that tweets 
evoke towards Jews, Judaism, or Israel 
independently from the classification of 
antisemitism.12 This was done on a five-point 
scale as well from 1-5 where: 
-2 = Tweet is very negative towards 
Jews, Judaism, or Israel 
-1 = Tweet is negative towards  
Jews, Judaism, or Israel 
0 = Tweet has neutral sentiment 
 or is not comprehensible 
1 = Tweet is positive towards  
Jews, Judaism, or Israel 
2 = Tweet is very positive towards  
Jews, Judaism, or Israel. 
A categorization such as this helps annotators 
to stick to the IHRA Definition. If a tweet is 
negative towards Jews, Judaism, or Israel but it 
does not fit the definition of the IHRA 
Definition, then annotators still have a way to 
express that. While most antisemitic tweets 
will be negative towards Jews or Israel there 
are oftentimes positive stereotypes such as 
descriptions of Jews as inherently intelligent or 
good merchants. On the other hand, some 
descriptions of individual Jews, Judaism, or 
Israel can be negative without being 
antisemitic. The sentiment scale might also be 
useful for further analysis of the tweets. Lastly, 
annotators can leave comments on each 
tweet. 
It took the annotators two minutes on average 
to evaluate each tweet.13 
Graphs 2 and 3 show the timelines for the 
number of tweets per day that include the 
word Jew* and Israel. 
making choices clickable for annotators. 
Unfortunately, the program was not fully 
operational and so we reverted to spreadsheets 
that link to Twitter. 
[10] 
 
 
Graph 2: Number of Tweets in 2018 per Day that have the Word Jew* (10 percent randomized sample), graph 
by DMI TCAT 
 
 
Graph 3: Number of Tweets 2018 per Day that have the Word Israel (10 percent randomized sample), graph by 
DMI TCAT 
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4 PRELIMINARY RESULTS 
PEAKS OF CONVERSATIONS ABOUT 
JEWS AND ISRAEL 
We draw from a dataset that collects 10 
percent of all tweets, randomly sampled, see 
description of the dataset above. This includes 
3,427,731 tweets from 1,460,075 different 
users that have the three letters JEW in this 
sequence, including Jewish, Jews, etc., in 2018. 
Our dataset also contains 2,980,327 tweets 
from 1,101,371 different users that have the 
word Israel in it (not including derivates, such 
as Israelis). From July 1, 2018, to the first part 
of July 25, 2018, the overall dataset included 
only one percent of all tweets. This resulted in 
a drop in the number of tweets containing our 
keywords during that period.  
The highest peaks of tweets with the word 
Jew* can be linked to offline events. By far, the 
highest peak is shortly after the shootings at 
the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, 
October 27, 2018. The second highest peak is 
during Passover, one of the most important 
Jewish holidays. British Labour opposition 
leader Jeremy Corbyn’s visit to a Seder event, 
April 3, at the controversial Jewish group 
“Jewdas” was vividly discussed on social 
media, including charges of antisemitism. The 
third peak can be found at the time when the 
U.S. Embassy was moved to Jerusalem. The 
fourth highest peak is on Holocaust Memorial 
Day, January 27. The fifth highest relates to a 
protest outside British Parliament against 
antisemitism within the Labour Party, March 
26.   
The five highest peaks of tweets containing the 
term Israel can also be linked to offline events. 
The highest peak on May 15, 2018, is the date 
when the U.S. Embassy was moved to 
 
14 n = p(1-p)(Z/ME)^2 with p= True proportion of all 
tweets containing antisemitic tweets; Z= z-score for 
the level of confidence (95% confidence); and ME= 
margin of error. 
Jerusalem, followed by the second highest 
peak, May 12, on the day when Netta Barzilai 
won the Eurovision Song Contest 2018 for 
Israel with her song "Toy." The peak on May 10 
relates to the Iranian rocket attack against 
Israel from Syrian territory and the response by 
Israeli warplanes. The peak on June 6 seems to 
be related to the successful campaign to cancel 
a friendly soccer match between Argentina 
and Israel and to the eruption of violence at 
the Israeli-Gazan border. The fifth highest peak 
in 2018 with the word “Israel” does not relate 
to the country Israel but to the last name of a 
law enforcement officer in Broward County, 
Florida. Sheriff Scott Israel came under scrutiny 
for his role at the Parkland High School 
shooting and important details were revealed 
on February 23. 
PERCENTAGES OF ANTISEMITIC 
TWEETS IN SAMPLES 
We drew randomized samples of 400 tweets 
for manual annotation from 2017 and 2018. In 
this paper, we discuss the annotation of two 
samples from 2018 by two annotators, each. 
One sample is a randomized sample of tweets 
with the word “Jew*” and the other with the 
word “Israel.” Previous samples with these 
terms included approximately ten percent that 
were antisemitic. Assuming that the 
proportion of antisemitic tweets is no larger 
than twenty percent, we can calculate the 
margin of error as up to four percent for the 
randomized sample of 400 tweets for a 95 
percent confidence level. 14  However, we 
discarded all deleted tweets and all tweets in 
foreign languages, which led to a significantly 
reduced sample size. In the sample of tweets 
with the word “Jew*” we also discarded all 
tweets that contained the word “jewelry” but 
not “Jew”.15 This resulted in a sample of 172 
15 We also discarded tweets with a misspelling of 
“jewelry,” that is “jewerly” and “jewery.” 128 
tweets (32 percent) were thus discarded. The large 
number of tweets related to jewelry seem to be 
spread out more evenly throughout the year. They 
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tweets with the word “Jew*” and a sample of 
247 tweets with the word “Israel.” 16  The 
calculated margin of error for a sample of 172 
tweets is six percent and for a sample of 247 
tweets it is five percent. However, there might 
be bias in discarding deleted tweets because 
the percentage of antisemitic tweets might be 
higher among deleted tweets. Although the 
text and metadata of deleted tweets was 
captured, we could not see the tweets in their 
context, that is, with images and previous 
conversations. Looking through the texts of 
deleted tweets shows that many but far from 
all deleted tweets are likely antisemitic.  
Some annotation results can be seen in table 1 
below. 
     
  "Jew*" 2018 
Sample Annotator 
B 
"Jew*" 2018 
Sample Annotator 
G 
"Israel" 2018 
Sample Annotator 
D 
"Israel" 2018 
Sample Annotator 
J 
Sample size without deleted 
tweets and tweets in foreign 
language (and without "Jewelry" 
tweets) 
172   172   247   247   
Confident antisemitic 10 5.8% 9 5.2% 16 8.2% 11 5.6% 
Probably antisemitic 21 12.2% 12 7.% 15 6.1% 12 4.9% 
SUM (probably) antisemitic 31 18.% 21 12.2% 31 14.3% 23 10.5% 
                  
Calling out antisemitism 25 14.5% 36 18.5% 12 6.2% 4 2.1% 
 
Table 1: Annotation Results of Two Samples  
 
 
The first annotator of the sample with the 
word “Jew*” classified eighteen percent of the 
tweets as antisemitic or probably antisemitic, 
while the second annotator classified twelve 
percent as such. The first annotator of the 
sample with the word “Israel” classified 
fourteen percent of the tweets as antisemitic 
or probably antisemitic, while the second 
annotator classified eleven percent as 
antisemitic/probably antisemitic. Interestingly, 
a high number of tweets (fifteen and nineteen 
percent) with the word “Jew*” were found to 
be calling out antisemitism. Tweets calling out 
antisemitism were significantly lower within 
the sample of “Israel” tweets (six and two 
percent). 
 
did not result in noticeable peaks. However, future 
queries should exclude tweets related to jewelry to 
avoid false results in peaks or other results related 
to metadata. 
The discrepancies in the annotation were often 
a result of a lack of understanding of the 
context, in addition to lapses in concentration 
and different interpretations of the respective 
tweets. Different interpretations of the 
definition of antisemitism seem to have been 
relatively rare. We discussed different 
interpretations of the definition in trial studies, 
which led to clarification that is now reflected 
in our inferences of the IHRA Working 
Definition, see Annex II. 
 
 
16 The annotators did not do the annotation at the 
same time. Some tweets were deleted during that 
time. For better comparison we only present the 
results of the annotation of tweets that were live 
during both annotations. 
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EXAMPLES OF TWEETS THAT ARE 
DIFFICULT TO FULLY UNDERSTAND  
Further investigation and discussion between 
annotators can help to understand the 
meaning of messages that are difficult to 
understand. This can lead to a re-classification 
of tweets. The three examples below appear 
less likely to be read in antisemitic ways than 
previously thought. Other cases went the 
opposite way. 
A good example for the difficulty of 
understanding the context and its message is 
the tweet “@realMatMolina 
@GothamGirlBlue There is a large Jewish 
population in the neighborhood and school” by 
user “WebMaven360” with the label “Stephen 
Miller – Secretary of White Nationalism”. The 
text itself without any context is certainly not 
antisemitic. However, annotator B classified it 
as “probably not antisemitic,” perhaps 
because of the user’s label. The tweet 
responds to another tweet that reads: “Few 
facts you may not know about the Parkland 
shooter: • He wore a Make America Great 
Again hat • Had a swastika carved into his gun 
• Openly expressed his hate for Muslims, Jews, 
and black people. Why weren't these things 
ever really talked about?” The response “There 
is a large Jewish population in the 
neighborhood and school” can be read as a 
Jewish conspiracy that suppresses this kind of 
information in the media. This would be 
covered by the definition’s paragraph 3.1.2, 
see Annex I. Annotator G classified the tweet 
as antisemitic. However, another, and 
probably more likely reading of the tweet 
sequence is that both users are critical of 
Trump and that the second tweet is simply 
providing additional evidence in support of the 
first tweet. Specifically, the second tweet is 
suggesting that the Parkland shooting was 
racially motivated, that it was not a random 
case of school violence, but rather aimed at a 
largely Jewish student body. Looking at other 
tweets of “Stephen Miller – Secretary of White 
Nationalism” and their followers reveals that 
they are in fact very critical of Stephen Miller 
and the Trump administration and often 
denounce racial bigotry. It is therefore likely 
that the message of this tweet did not transmit 
any antisemitic connotations to the readers. 
Image 2: “There is a large Jewish population...” 
A careful reading is necessary and closer 
investigation can often clarify if there is an 
antisemitic message or not. In other cases it 
remains unclear. A case in point is a comment 
about Harvey Weinstein and his interview with 
Taki Theodoracopulos in the Spectator, July 13, 
2018. 
 
Image 3: “Harvey Weinstein, who is Jewish…” 
The tweet comments on the headline of the 
interview with Weinstein and on the fact that 
the interviewer is a well-known figure of the 
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extreme right. 17  The tweet reads “Harvey 
Weinstein, who is Jewish and an active 
Democrat, picked a neo-fascist who has 
trafficked in anti-semitism to tell his side of the 
story. Plenty of people within the ruling class 
personally despise the far-right, but that 
doesn't mean they don't find them useful.” The 
first sentence which identifies Weinstein as 
Jewish and a democrat is not antisemitic. The 
second sentence however identifies Weinstein 
also as a member of “the ruling class” who 
“uses” the far-right and even a “neo-fascist” 
for their own purposes. It is unclear what 
makes him a member of “the ruling class” and 
if his Jewishness is seen as a factor for this. The 
two sentences together, however, can be 
interpreted as the old antisemitic stereotype 
of Jews being or influencing “the ruling class” 
and using all means to push their political 
agenda. This is covered by the definition’s 
paragraph 3.1.2. Both annotators classified the 
tweet as “probably antisemitic.” However, 
there is also a non-antisemitic reading of the 
tweet sequence whereby Weinstein is part of 
the ruling class by virtue of his wealth and 
influence in an important industry. Alluding to 
Weinstein’s Jewishness would thus serve to 
further illustrate elites‘ supposed willingness 
to use even their worst enemies if it helps 
them stay in power. The reference to 
Weinstein’s Jewish heritage can thus be read 
as secondary in importance, used only to 
highlight the extreme lengths an elite would go 
to stay in power. At the same time, any reader 
with animus to Jews may elevate the 
importance of Weinstein’s Jewish heritage 
regardless of the author’s intent. 
 
17  Taki Theodoracopulos founded The American 
Conservative magazine with Pat Buchanan and 
Scott McConnell, wrote in support of the Greek 
ultranationalist political party Golden Dawn, made 
Richard Spencer an editor of his online magazine 
and he was accused of antisemitism even in the 
Spectator, March 3, 2001. 
18 Azfarovski used a name in Arabic (see screenshot) 
that reads “albino broccoli.” He has since changed 
that twitter handle several times. 
Some tweets that contain antisemitic 
stereotypes can be read as such or as calling 
out antisemitism by exaggerating it and 
mocking the stereotypes. User “Azfarovski” 
wrote “If you listen carefully, Pikachu says 
“Pika pika Pikachu” which sounds similar to 
“Pick a Jew” which is English for “Yahudi pilihan 
saya” Allahuakhbar. Another one of the ways 
they are trying to corrupt the minds of young 
Muslims.” “Azfarovski” seems to be the 
genuine account of Azfar Firdaus, a Malaysian 
fashion model.18 The account has more than 
45,000 followers. The particular tweet was 
retweeted more than 4,000 times and was 
liked by almost the same number of users. The 
tweet contains a particular absurd antisemitic 
conspiracy theory, a conspiracy theory 
however, that closely resembles widespread 
rumors about Pokemon in the Middle East that 
even led to a banning of Pokemon in Saudi 
Arabia and the accusation of promoting 
“global Zionism” and Freemasonry. 19  These 
kind of rumors are covered by paragraphs 3.0 
and 3.1.2 of the Working Definition of Anti-
Semitism and the accusation that Jews 
allegedly conspire to wage war against “the 
Muslims” is a classic antisemitic stereotype 
within Islamist circles, see paragraph on 
“Jewish crimes” in Annex II. Both annotators 
classified the tweet as antisemitic.  
However, there is also the possibility that this 
tweet ridicules antisemitic conspiracy theories 
and thereby calls out antisemitism. How is the 
tweet read, what is the context? What is the 
evidence for it being anti-antisemitic instead of 
it transmitting an antisemitic conspiracy 
theory?  
19  Pokemon was banned in Saudi Arabia with a 
fatwa in 2001. The fatwa accused Pokémon of 
promoting the Shinto religion of Japan, Christianity, 
Freemasonry and “global Zionism.” The Times of 
Israel, July 20, 2016, “Saudi revives fatwa on 
‘Zionism-promoting’ Pokemon,” 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/saudi-fatwa-on-
zionist-pokemon-for-promoting-evolution/ 
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Image 4: “If you listen carefully, Pikachu says…” 
“Azfarovski’s” other tweets and discussions in 
his threads are rarely about Jews or anything 
related. There are some allusions to conspiracy 
theories with Illuminati, but they are rare and 
made (half-) jokingly. We did not find any 
tweet in which he distanced himself from 
conspiracy theories or bigotry against Jews. 
However, back in 2016, “Azfarovski” wrote a 
similar tweet. He commented on a discussion 
in which another user questioned the alleged 
connection between Pokemon and Jews: 
“Pikachu is actually pronounced as Pick-A-Jew 
to be your friend. Omg. OMG ILLUMINATI 
CONFIRMED.” This is extremely suggestive and 
might have been read as satire. While the 
user’s intention remains unclear, how do his 
followers interpret the tweet?  
The direct responses to the tweet show a 
mixed picture. 20 The response “lowkey upset 
that i was born too late to truly appreciate the 
massive waves of Pokemon conspiracies back 
in the late 90s and early 00s,” shows that its 
author, “TehlohSuwi” dismisses this as a, 
perhaps funny, conspiracy theory and does not 
take it seriously. Others however responded 
with memes of disbelief such as the images 
below or various forms of disagreement, such 
as user “namuh” who said “What kind of shit is 
this? Equating Pika pika Pikachu to "pick a Jew" 
is outta this world! […]”. This suggests that they 
took the message at face value but disagreed. 
 
20 Many of the responses were in Indonesian. 
The examples presented here were in English. 
User “medicalsherry” was unsure: “This is 
sarcasm,right?” Other users did not object to 
the conspiracy theory but just to the alleged 
impact of it. “Not for who don’t really mind 
about it.. unless their mind is really easy and 
wanted to be corrupted..” replied user 
“ash_catrina”.  
  
 
Image 5: User “shxh’s” response to “Azfarovski’s” 
tweet, 18 Nov 2018  
 
 
Image 6: User “monoluque’s” response to 
“Azfarovski’s” tweet, 18 Nov 2018  
Going through the profiles and tweet histories 
of the 4000+ users who retweeted the tweet in 
question also provides information about how 
the tweet was perceived. The large majority of 
them has neither a history of antisemitic 
conspiracy theories nor of calling them out. 
However, some of them show some affinity to 
conspiracy theories, e.g. about Illuminati.  
Thus, the tweet evoked antisemitic 
connotations at least in some of the readers 
even if it cannot be established whether the 
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disseminator endorses this fantasy or they are 
merely mocking it. 
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ANNOTATORS 
Disagreement between annotators are due to 
a number of reasons, including lack of context 
and different opinions of the definition of the 
bias in question (Waseem and Hovy 2016, 89–
90). In our tweets including the word “Jew*” 
annotator B classified more tweets as 
“probably antisemitic” than annotator G. This 
is partly because annotator B is not sufficiently 
familiar with ways to denounce antisemitism 
and with organizations who do so. For 
example, annotator B classified a tweet by 
MEMRI, the Middle East Media Research 
Institute, an organization that tracks 
antisemitism in media from the Middle East, as 
antisemitic. This tweet documents a talk that 
might be seen as antisemitic, see screenshot 
image 7 below. However, the tweet calls this 
out and annotator G correctly classified this as 
calling out antisemitism and confidently not 
antisemitic. 
 
Image 7: “South African Politician…” 
Different classifications of other tweets might 
be due to unclear messages. User “Scrooched” 
tweeted “Seems like Jared is a Jew/Nazi Hitler 
would've been proud of. We know that Miller is 
a white supremacists & that #IdiotInChief is 
listening to those dangerous to our democracy 
fools. Wouldnt it be nice if we had @POTUS 
who had a brain and believed our rule of law 
#TrumpCrimeFamily.” Saying that Jared 
Kushner is a Nazi or “a Jew Hitler would’ve 
been proud of” can be seen as a form of 
demonizing Kushner and even of downplaying 
the Nazi ideology in which it was not 
conceivable that Hitler would have been 
“proud” of any Jew. Annotator B therefore 
classified the tweet as probably antisemitic 
while annotator G did not see enough evidence 
for a demonization of a Jewish person or for 
denying the “intentionality of the genocide of 
the Jewish people at the hands of National 
Socialist Germany” (Working Definition, 
paragraph 3.1.4) and classified the tweet as 
“probably not antisemitic.” 
Image 8: “Seems like Jared is a Jew/Nazi…” 
The discrepancies between the two annotators 
for the “Israel” sample were bigger than 
between the annotators for the “Jew*” sample 
but the reasons were similar. Annotator J 
classified a tweet by “syria-updates” (see 
screenshot image 9) as probably not 
antisemitic while annotator D classified it as 
antisemitic. The tweet contains a link to an 
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article on the “Syria News” website entitled 
“Comeuppance Time as Syrian Arab Army 
Strikes Israel in the Occupied Golan Heights,” 
from May 12, 2018. The caption under the 
embedded image in the tweet suggests that 
this might be antisemitic by using the phrase 
“MI6/CIA/Israel loyalist media made claims 
that [...].”However, it is only when reading the 
linked article itself it becomes clear that 
antisemitic tropes are disseminated. The 
article states that “the media“ are reading 
“directly from the Israeli script.” The classic 
antisemitic image of Jews controlling the 
media is thus used to characterize Israel, which 
is covered by paragraph 3.1.9 of the IHRA 
Working Definition. The discrepancy in the 
annotation seems to stem from one annotator 
spending time reading the linked article while 
the other did not. 
 
Image 9: “SyrianNews.cc” 
A tweet that both annotators agreed was 
spreading an antisemitic message was a 
retweet that was originally sent out by the user 
“BDSmovement.” It included a link to a short 
video in which former United Nations Special 
Rapporteur Richard Falk proclaimed that Israel 
was an Apartheid state and called for the 
Jewish State to cease to exist, which is covered 
by paragraph 3.1.7 of the IHRA Definition, that 
is “Denying the Jewish people their right to 
self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the 
existence of a State of Israel is a racist 
endeavor.” 
 
Image 10: “BDS movement” 
 
5 DISCUSSION 
We applied the IHRA Working Definition of 
Antisemitism to tweets by spelling out some of 
the inferences necessary for such an 
application. In particular we expand on the 
classic antisemitic stereotypes that are not all 
named in the Working Definition by going 
through scholarly works that have focused on 
such classic antisemitic stereotypes. The IHRA 
Definition and the documented inferences are 
sufficiently comprehensive for the annotation 
of online messages on the mainstream social 
media platform Twitter. However, additional 
antisemitic stereotypes and antisemitic 
symbols (images, words, or numbers) exist in 
circles that we have not yet explored, and 
some will be newly created. These can be 
added to the list as needed. 
In evaluating messages on social media that 
connect people around the world, partly 
anonymously, it does not make sense to 
evaluate intent. The messages, which often get 
retweeted by other users, should be evaluated 
for their impact in a given context. The 
question is if the message disseminates 
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antisemitic tropes and not if that was the 
intention. 
The annotation of tweets and comparison 
between annotators showed that annotators 
need to be a) highly trained to understand the 
definition of antisemitism, b) knowledgeable 
about a wide range of topics that are discussed 
on Twitter, and, perhaps most importantly, c) 
be diligent and detail-oriented, including with 
regard to embedded links and the context. This 
is particularly important to distinguish 
antisemitic tweets from tweets that call out 
antisemitism which they often do by using 
irony. This confirms findings of another study 
that relates low agreement between 
annotators of hate speech to the fact that they 
were non-experts (Fortuna et al. 2019, 97). 
Discussion between qualified annotators in 
which they explain the rationale for their 
classification is likely to result in better 
classification than using statistical measures 
across a larger number of (less qualified) 
annotators. 
An analysis of the 2018 timeline of all tweets 
with the word “Jew*” (3,427,731 tweets) and 
“Israel” (2,980,327 tweets), drawn from the 
ten percent random sample of all tweets, show 
that the major peaks are correlated to 
discussions of offline events. In our 
representative samples of live tweets on 
conversations about Jews and Israel we found 
relatively large numbers of tweets that are 
antisemitic or probably antisemitic, between 
eleven and fourteen percent in conversations 
including the term “Israel” and between 
twelve and eighteen percent in conversations 
including the term “Jew,*” depending on the 
annotator. It is likely that there is a higher 
percentage of antisemitic tweets within 
deleted tweets. However, in conversations 
about Jews the percentage of tweets calling 
out antisemitism was even higher (between 
fifteen and nineteen percent depending on the 
annotator). This was not the case in 
conversations about Israel where only a small 
percentage of tweets called out antisemitism 
(two to six percent depending on the 
annotator). Antisemitism related to Israel 
seems to be highlighted and opposed less 
often than forms of antisemitism that are 
related to Jews in general. These preliminary 
findings should be examined in further 
research.  
Our study does not provide an annotated 
corpus that can serve as a gold standard for 
antisemitic online message, but we hope that 
these reflections might be helpful towards this 
broader goal. 
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ANNEX I: IHRA DEFINITION OF 
ANTISEMITISM 
The International Holocaust Remembrance 
Alliance (IHRA), an organization with 31 
member countries, including the United 
States, Canada, and most EU countries, 
adopted a non-legally binding working 
definition of antisemitism in 2016, which is a 
slightly modified version of the Working 
Definition that was previously used unofficially 
by the European Union Monitoring Centre on 
Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) and its 
successor organization the EU Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA). The definition has 
since been adopted by nine country 
governments and numerous governmental 
and non-governmental bodies.21 In December 
2018, the European Council called on all EU 
countries to also adopt the definition. It is thus 
by now the most widely accepted definition of 
antisemitism. The definition was “created in 
response to a perceived need by police officers 
and the intergovernmental agencies to 
understand the forms and directions that 
antisemitism now takes, and after 
consideration of many drafts by a wide range 
of Jewish and non-Jewish specialists.“ (Whine 
2018, 16).  
For the sake of clarity, we gave the definition 
section labels. Otherwise, the text below in 
square brackets is the unaltered text of the 
IHRA Working Definition.  
 
[1.0 “Antisemitism is a certain perception of 
Jews, which may be expressed as hatred 
toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical 
manifestations of antisemitism are directed 
toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals 
and/or their property, toward Jewish 
community institutions and religious 
facilities.” 
 
21 
https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/news-
archive/working-definition-antisemitism 
 
2.0 To guide IHRA in its work, the following 
examples may serve as illustrations: 
 
3.0 Manifestations might include the targeting 
of the state of Israel, conceived as a Jewish 
collectivity. However, criticism of Israel similar 
to that leveled against any other country 
cannot be regarded as antisemitic. 
Antisemitism frequently charges Jews with 
conspiring to harm humanity, and it is often 
used to blame Jews for “why things go wrong.” 
It is expressed in speech, writing, visual forms 
and action, and employs sinister stereotypes 
and negative character traits. 
  
3.1 Contemporary examples of antisemitism in 
public life, the media, schools, the workplace, 
and in the religious sphere could, taking into 
account the overall context, include, but are 
not limited to: 
 
3.1.1 Calling for, aiding, or justifying the 
killing or harming of Jews in the name of a 
radical ideology or an extremist view of 
religion. 
 
3.1.2 Making mendacious, dehumanizing, 
demonizing, or stereotypical allegations 
about Jews as such or the power of Jews as 
collective — such as, especially but not 
exclusively, the myth about a world Jewish 
conspiracy or of Jews controlling the 
media, economy, government or other 
societal institutions. 
 
3.1.3 Accusing Jews as a people of being 
responsible for real or imagined 
wrongdoing committed by a single Jewish 
person or group, or even for acts 
committed by non-Jews. 
 
3.1.4 Denying the fact, scope, mechanisms 
(e.g. gas chambers) or intentionality of the 
genocide of the Jewish people at the hands 
of National Socialist Germany and its 
supporters and accomplices during World 
War II (the Holocaust). 
[23] 
 
 
3.1.5 Accusing the Jews as a people, or 
Israel as a state, of inventing or 
exaggerating the Holocaust. 
  
3.1.6 Accusing Jewish citizens of being 
more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged 
priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the 
interests of their own nations. 
 
3.1.7 Denying the Jewish people their right 
to self-determination, e.g., by claiming 
that the existence of a State of Israel is a 
racist endeavor. 
  
3.1.8 Applying double standards by 
requiring of it a behavior not expected or 
demanded of any other democratic nation. 
  
3.1.9 Using the symbols and images 
associated with classic antisemitism (e.g., 
claims of Jews killing Jesus or blood libel) to 
characterize Israel or Israelis. 
 
3.1.10 Drawing comparisons of 
contemporary Israeli policy to that of the 
Nazis. 
 
3.1.11 Holding Jews collectively 
responsible for actions of the state of 
Israel. 
 
4.0 Antisemitic acts are criminal when they 
are so defined by law (for example, denial of 
the Holocaust or distribution of antisemitic 
materials in some countries). 
  
5.0 Criminal acts are antisemitic when the 
targets of attacks, whether they are people or 
property – such as buildings, schools, places of 
worship and cemeteries – are selected because 
they are, or are perceived to be, Jewish or 
linked to Jews.] 
  
6.0 Antisemitic discrimination is the denial to 
Jews of opportunities or services available to 
others and is illegal in many countries.] 
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ANNEX II: INFERENCES OF THE 
IHRA WORKING DEFINITION 
In order to apply the IHRA Working Definition 
of Antisemitism to the annotation of a dataset 
of tweets some parts require extrapolation. 
However, we strove to stay within the original 
meaning of the definition and refrained from 
adding any new concepts. The definition 
includes references, such as “classic 
antisemitism” and “stereotypical allegations 
about Jews.” We made such references explicit 
by listing prominent stereotypes and images 
that are considered to be such stereotypes. We 
spell out explicitly what we believe is implicitly 
in the text. Any inferences should not be 
understood as changing the content of the 
definition.  
The very first paragraph (1.0) notes that non-
Jewish individuals can also become victims of 
antisemitism. We infer from section 5.0 that 
this is the case if they are perceived to be 
Jewish or linked to Jews. Additionally, we infer 
from section 3.1.2 that rhetoric can be 
antisemitic even if no specific Jewish individual 
or communal institution is targeted, but 
rather, the target is an abstract Jewish 
collective. 
Section 3.1 lists 11 examples of contemporary 
forms of antisemitism. The IHRA has made it 
clear in additional statements that the 
examples are part of the definition.22 
The example of Holocaust denial (3.14) 
includes denying the scope and the 
intentionality of the genocide of the Jewish 
 
22  A statement from July 19, 2018, on the IHRA 
website says: The Working Definition, including its 
examples, was reviewed and decided upon 
unanimously during the IHRA's Bucharest plenary in 
May 2016.” 
https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/news-
archive/working-definition-antisemitism A 
separate declaration was issued by UK delegates to 
the IHRA, August 7, 2018, due to a political debate 
about only partial adoption of the definition by the 
British Labor party. It included the following 
people. Denying the scope of the Holocaust 
means denying that close to six million Jews 
were murdered for being Jews. The IHRA also 
adopted a “Working Definition of Holocaust 
Denial and Distortion.” It is in accordance with 
its definition of antisemitism and further 
exemplifies that Holocaust denial “may include 
publicly denying or calling into doubt the use of 
principal mechanisms of destruction (such as 
gas chambers, mass shooting, starvation and 
torture)” and also “blaming the Jews for either 
exaggerating or creating the Shoah for political 
or financial gain as if the Shoah itself was the 
result of a conspiracy plotted by the Jews.” 23 
3.1.7 mentions denying the Jewish people their 
right to self-determination. Taking into 
account the next example, 3.1.8, “Applying 
double standards by requiring of it a behavior 
not expected or demanded of any other 
democratic nation” we include the denial of 
Israel’s right to exist in its geographical region. 
However, the second part of 3.1.7, “claiming 
that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist 
endeavor” does not mean that all accusations 
of racism against Israel are antisemitic. It 
means that claiming that a State of Israel as per 
se racist (or an Apartheid state) is an example 
of denying the Jewish people their right to self-
determination and is therefore antisemitic. 
The Working Definition mentions 
“mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or 
stereotypical allegations about Jews as such” 
and “classic stereotypes” without listing them 
explicitly. Below you find a composite of 
allegations and stereotypes that have become 
part of that repertoire. We compiled them by 
statement: “Any ‘modified’ version of the IHRA 
definition that does not include all of its 11 
examples is no longer the IHRA definition.”  
https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/news-
archive/statement-experts-uk-delegation-ihra-
working-definition-antisemitism 
23 The “Working Definition of Holocaust Denial and 
Distortion” was adopted by the IHRA’s 31 member 
countries in October 2013, 
https://www.holocaustremembrance.com/workin
g-definition-holocaust-denial-and-distortion. 
[25] 
 
looking at descriptions that other scholars 
(Lipton 2014; Nirenberg 2013; Poliakov 2003b; 
2003a; 2003c; 2003d; Rosenfeld 2013; 2015; 
Wistrich 2010; Perry and Schweitzer 2008; 
Livak 2010) have identified as prominent 
antisemitic stereotypes in the past 2000 years. 
Antisemitic allegations and stereotypes can be 
made by characterizing “the Jews” or by 
ascribing certain physical traits to them. 
Accusations of wrongdoing on the part of Jews 
also form part of the rich history of antisemitic 
stereotypes, as well as certain tropes. They can 
also be shown in the demonization of things 
and individuals that are thought of as being 
representative of Jews or Jewish beliefs. 
Certain beliefs, usually religious in nature, 
advocate for the punishment of Jews and also 
belong to the antisemitic tradition. Endorsing 
Nazism, Holocaust denial, or Israel-related 
forms of antisemitism are newer phenomena 
that are addressed explicitly and with 
examples in the working definition. 
Supposed “Jewish character” is portrayed as 
stingy; greedy; immensely rich; being good 
with money; exploitative; corrupt; amoral; 
perverted; ruthless; cruel; heartless; anti-
national/cosmopolitan; treacherous; disloyal; 
fraudulent; dishonest; untrustworthy; 
hypocrites; materialist; swank; work-shy; 
uncreative; intelligent; possess superhuman 
powers; arrogant; stubborn; culturally 
backwards; superstitious; ridiculous; 
dishonorable; hyper-sexual; ritually unclean; 
tribal; clannish; secretive; racist; men: 
effeminate and also lecherous; women: 
femme-fatal. 
Supposed “Jewish physical stereotypes” are 
hooked noses; pointed beards; big ears; a 
weak or hunched frame; a dark complexion; 
hooves; horns; a tail and a goatee; unruly red 
or black hair; goggled eyes; blinded eyes; tired 
eyes; large lips; and an odor. 
Antisemitic imagery can be found in 
depictions of Jews as the "wandering Jew”; 
demonic figures; lavishly rich capitalists; 
money/gold hoarding; hooked-nosed 
communists; heartless merchants; parasites 
and vile creatures such as beasts; octopi; 
snakes; rats; germs; and blood sucking entities. 
Supposed “Jewish crimes” include the charge 
of deicide/ killing Jesus; being in league with 
the devil; seeking to destroy non-Jewish 
civilizations; working with alleged 
conspiratorial groups thriving for world power, 
such as Rothschilds, Freemasons, Illuminati, 
Jewish lobby, Zionist Lobby, Zionist Neocons, 
ZOG (Zionist Occupied Government); waging a 
(proxy) war against Islam/ Christianity; luring 
Christians/ Muslims away from Christianity/ 
Islam; profanation of  Christian symbols; host 
desecration; practicing witchcraft; usury; 
profiteering; exploiting non-Jews; running 
transnational, allegedly “Jewish companies” in 
the interest of the Jews such as McDonalds, 
Starbucks, Coca Cola, Facebook; using blood 
from non-Jews for ritual purposes; killing or 
mutilating children for ritual purposes; adoring 
false gods and idols, such as the Golden Calf 
and Moloch; rejecting truth and being blind to 
the truth; perverting scripture; sticking to the 
letters but not the spirit of religious texts; 
falsifying scripture; having tried to murder the 
prophet Mohammed; well poisoning; causing 
epidemics, such as Black Death and AIDS; being 
responsible for the slave trade; poisoning non-
Jews; aspiring to control the world secretly; 
secretly controlling world finance, country 
governments, media, Hollywood; 
orchestrating wars, revolutions, disasters 
(such as 9/11 and the subsequent wars in the 
Middle East); undermining culture and morals, 
especially concerning sexuality; degrading 
culture, music, science; degenerating race 
purity; undermining and betraying their 
countries of residence; inventing the 
Holocaust or exaggerating the Holocaust for 
material gain; being responsible for 
Christianity and the power of the church, for 
oligarchies, financial speculation, exploitation, 
capitalism, modernity, communism, 
bolshevism, liberalism, democracy, 
urbanization, Americanization, and 
globalization. 
[26] 
 
Demonization of things associated with Jews 
or of individuals seen as representative of Jews 
include the demonization of synagogues, 
Judaism, the Talmud, Kabbalah; the 
Judaization of enemies (using “Jew” as an 
insult); and the demonization of prominent 
Jews, such George Soros, Ariel Sharon, 
Benjamin Netanyahu, and Abraham Foxman as 
Jews. 
Nonvisual memes or recurrent phraseology 
that are part of an antisemitic repertoire in 
different historical and cultural contexts 
include “Jews are the children/ spawn of Satan; 
synagogue of Satan; God has (eternally) cursed 
the Jews; Judaism (Jewish alleged choseness) is 
racist; Jews don’t have a home country and 
cannot be a nation; Jews have no culture; 
Crypto Jews (converted Jews or their offspring 
remain Jewish and secretly act in the ‘Jewish 
interest’); ‘Jewish spirit’ in science, music, 
culture is harmful to non-Jews; use of the 
terms ‘Jewish terror’ or ‘Zydokumuna’ for 
purges under communism; Jewish soldiers in 
WW1/ WW2 were traitors; all pro-Jewish or 
pro-Israeli organizations are funded/ operated 
by the Mossad; Jews are descendants of 
monkeys and pigs; Jews should never be taken 
as friends; Jews are the eternal enemies of 
Islam and Muslims. Muslims will kill the Jews at 
the end of time; reference to the battle of 
Khaybar; synagogues should be set on fire; 
Jews killed  or sold out their own prophets/the 
son of God; Jews try to evade taxes/ Jews don’t 
pay taxes; Hitler let some Jews live so that the 
world would know why he exterminated Jews; 
‘International Zionism’ prevents a critical 
discussion about the Holocaust.” 
Calls for punishment or justification of Jewish 
suffering have also been part of an antisemitic 
discourse, mostly in religious contexts, such as 
“Jewish suffering is punishment by God; 
Humiliation and misery of Jews is proof of the 
truth of Christianity/Islam. Misery of Jews is 
proof of truth of Christianity.; Jews should be 
burnt as a form of punishment; Persecution of 
Jews under Hitler was punishment by God." 
Holocaust denial is described in the IHRA 
Definition of Antisemitism. The more detailed 
IHRA Working Definition of Holocaust Denial 
and Distortion is used as additional guidance. 
Endorsing Nazism today means endorsing the 
systematic killings of Jews by the Nazis (and 
their helpers). It is often done by the 
affirmative use of pro-Nazi memes and 
symbols. 
Manifestations of antisemitism related to 
Israel are described in the Working Definition, 
including examples. Additional, frequently 
used antisemitic concepts include "Jews 
crucify or ritually kill Palestinians" and the use 
of term such as "Zionist Entity" to describe the 
State of Israel, which is a refusal to 
acknowledge the existence of Israel and thus a 
form of denying the Jewish people their right 
to self-determination. The following claims are 
“comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to 
that of the Nazis” (example 3.1.10 in the 
working definition): equating Israeli politicians 
with Nazi leaders, such as Netanyahu = Hitler; 
claims that Israel engages in genocide/ “a 
Holocaust” against the Palestinian people; 
claims that the situation in the Gaza Strip is 
similar to the situation in the Warsaw Ghetto; 
using Nazi vocabulary to describe and 
denounce actions by the Israeli state, such as 
claims that Israel wages a war of extermination 
against the Palestinians. 
Most symbols that have an antisemitic 
connotation are positive references to Nazism 
or to the Holocaust, such as the swastika or 
other Nazi or Nazi-predecessor flags, the Hitler 
salute, emblems of Nazi organizations such as 
the SS, Nazi slogans such as “Blut und Ehre” 
(blood and honor), or numbers representing 
“Heil Hitler” (88), “Adolf Hitler” (18). Positive 
references to the Holocaust used to manifest 
endorsement for the killing of Jews include 
symbols representing Zyklon B gas, including 
hissing noises, or references to ovens that 
were used to burn the people who were 
gassed (including pictures taken from these 
ovens).  
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The ADL Hate Symbols Database provides an 
extensive list of symbols used by hate groups, 
mostly white supremacists and Neo-Nazis. 24 
This list helps us to contextualize tweets. We 
consider all symbols with positive references 
to Nazism antisemitic because they implicitly 
endorse the murder of Jews. Symbols by 
extremist Christian and Muslim groups are not 
as extensively documented (Ostovar 2017).25 
Some Jihadist groups, such as Hamas or 
Houthi,26 are known for their antisemitism and 
lethally targeting victims as Jews. Endorsing 
the aforementioned groups is treated as a 
context suggesting antisemitism, but is 
annotated as antisemitic only when there are 
other references in the tweets to Jews, 
Judaism, or Israel that make an antisemitic 
reading of it likely. 
 
24  https://www.adl.org/education-and-
resources/resource-knowledge-base/hate-symbols 
25 The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point 
has published an extensive list of Jihadist imagery 
with the Militant Imagery Project. 
26  The inscription of the Houthi flag reads (in 
Arabic): "God is the Greatest, Death to America, 
Death to Israel, Curse on the Jews, Victory to Islam." 
